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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Steven Papp filed this failure-to-warn product liability 
suit against The Boeing Company in the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, alleging that his late wife, Mary,1 was made ill 
by exposure to asbestos from a Boeing aircraft.  Boeing 
removed Papp’s failure-to-warn suit to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis of 
the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  
According to Boeing, it was acting as a government 
contractor when it engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct.  
After removal, Papp filed a motion to remand the case to state 
court, which the District Court granted.  The District Court 
ruled that Boeing had failed to meet a “special burden” of 
establishing that a federal officer or agency affirmatively 
prohibited Boeing from warning third parties of the dangers 
of asbestos found in planes manufactured in the mid-
twentieth century.  Because we conclude that the federal 
officer removal statute extends to contractors who possess a 
colorable federal defense, and that Boeing made a sufficient 
showing of such a defense at the time of removal, we will 
reverse.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND  
 
 Papp, individually and on behalf of Mary’s estate, 
alleges that Mary suffered secondary “take home” asbestos 
exposure while washing the work clothes of her first husband, 
Robert Keck.  Keck had several jobs that exposed him to 
                                              
 1 For clarity, and intending no disrespect by undue 
familiarity of address, throughout this opinion we refer to 
Mary Papp as “Mary” and to Steven Papp as “Papp.”  
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asbestos, including one for the New Brunswick Plating Co. 
(“New Brunswick”) in the late 1970s.  While working for 
New Brunswick, Keck sandblasted the landing gear of World 
War II military cargo planes to prepare the gear for repairs.  
Papp contends that that process resulted in Keck having 
airborne asbestos fibers adhere to his clothing so that Mary, 
who handled the clothes, inhaled the asbestos.  
 
On August 12, 2013, Papp sued a host of companies in 
New Jersey, alleging injuries to Mary from exposure to 
asbestos.  He filed his First Amended Complaint (the 
“Complaint”) on August 16, 2013, adding Boeing as a 
defendant, both individually and as successor-by-merger to 
the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.  The Complaint did not 
indicate which Boeing or Douglas aircraft was claimed to 
have been the source of Mary’s asbestos exposure.  At her 
deposition taken on September 5, 2013, however, Mary 
specified that the landing gear Keck sandblasted was for a 
military cargo plane called the C-47.  The C-47 was built by 
the Douglas Aircraft Company, a predecessor company to 
Boeing,2 for the United States Navy and Air Force during 
World War II.  Once Boeing learned the identity of the 
aircraft, it promptly removed the case to federal court 
pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1442(a)(1).  That statute permits a defendant to remove a 
case to federal court from the state court where suit was 
originally filed, provided the allegedly culpable behavior took 
                                              
2 For ease of reference, and as the District Court did, 
we refer to the Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation, and The Boeing Company collectively 
as “Boeing,” unless otherwise specified.  
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place while the defendant was acting under the direction of a 
federal officer or agency.  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). 
 
The federal officer removal statute requires that the 
defendant possess a colorable federal defense.  In re 
Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or 
Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 466 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Defender Ass’n”), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 980 & 994 
(2016).  Boeing asserted that it was entitled to the federal 
defense of government contractor immunity because the C-47 
was produced for, and under the specific supervision of, the 
United States military.  More specifically, Boeing argued that 
the government’s oversight extended to labels and warnings 
for all parts of the aircraft, including those parts laden with 
the asbestos to which Keck, and in turn Mary, would later be 
exposed.  Boeing also states that, to the extent that the 
dangers of asbestos were known at the time, the government’s 
knowledge of those dangers was superior to that of Boeing.  
As part of its notice of removal, Boeing included the 
declaration of Larry Fogg (the “Fogg Declaration”).  Fogg 
was a longtime employee of Douglas, who attested, based on 
his experience and review of the company’s contracts and 
records, to the factual underpinnings of Boeing’s legal 
position.   
 
Papp moved to remand the case back to state court, 
and, of course, Boeing opposed remand.  The District Court 
granted the motion.  It held that, because Boeing was a 
contractor and not a federal officer, it had a “special burden” 
to demonstrate that it was acting under the control of the 
federal government.  (App. at 6.)  The Court said that, to 
prove removal jurisdiction, Boeing was required to show that 
it performed “the complained-of activity at the direction of 
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official federal authority.”  (App. at 8 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  Because the allegedly wrongful behavior 
was the failure to warn third parties of asbestos, the Court 
concluded that Boeing must show “that a federal officer or 
agency directly prohibited Boeing from issuing, or otherwise 
providing, warnings as to the risks associated with exposure 
to asbestos contained in products on which third-parties … 
worked or otherwise provided services.”  (App. at 11.)  Using 
that standard, the Court decided that Boeing did not meet its 
special burden and that remand to state court was proper.   
Boeing timely appealed.   
 
II.  DISCUSSION3 
 
A. THE FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE 
 
“We review de novo whether the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction[,]” including a court’s decision to 
remand for a lack of jurisdiction.  Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 
465.  At the heart of the present jurisdictional dispute is the 
federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  As 
with any removal from state court, removal under 
§ 1442(a)(1) begins with the filing of a notice “containing a 
short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1446(a).  Because a motion to remand shares an 
essentially identical procedural posture with a challenge to 
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
                                              
3 The District Court’s jurisdiction is squarely at issue 
in this case, as discussed below.  We have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s order to remand pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1447(d). 
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Procedure 12(b)(1), it is properly evaluated using the same 
analytical approach.  Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 361 (2014); see also 
Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 466 (applying same 12(b)(1) 
framework to challenge of jurisdiction after removal).   
 
“A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack.”  Davis v. 
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016).  A facial 
attack “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without 
disputing the facts alleged in the [notice of removal], and it 
requires the court to consider the allegations … as true.”  Id.  
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  A factual 
attack, in contrast, disputes “the factual allegations underlying 
the [] assertion of jurisdiction,” and involves the presentation 
of competing facts. 4  Id.  Because Papp challenges 
jurisdiction facially, “we construe the facts in the removal 
                                              
4 While a factual attack on jurisdiction after removal is 
permissible, such a challenge should only be considered to 
the extent that the facts presented, if persuasive, would 
directly undermine one of the four elements of Section 1442 
that must be present to confer jurisdiction.  See infra at n.5 
and related text.  To the extent that such a challenge bleeds 
into the merits of the case, the District Court ought not 
address it in terms of jurisdiction.  See Davis, 824 F.3d at 
348; see also Cuomo v. Crane Co., 771 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“To the extent that [a plaintiff’s] competing testimony 
challenges the accuracy or reliability of [a defendant’s] 
evidence, it does not undercut [the defendant’s] right to 
removal, but rather raises the very type of factual dispute 
about the validity of the defense that should be submitted to 
the judgment of a federal court.”). 
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notice in the light most favorable to [Boeing].”  Defender 
Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 466. 
 
The federal officer removal statute has existed in 
varying forms for some two-hundred years.  Its central aim is 
protecting officers of the federal government from 
interference by litigation in state court while those officers are 
trying to carry out their duties.  Willingham v. Morgan, 395 
U.S. 402, 405-06 (1969).  The statute has been amended over 
the years to permit removal in a broader set of circumstances.  
As currently framed and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), it 
provides, in relevant part:  
 
A civil action … commenced in a State court 
and that is against … any of the following may 
be removed by them to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division 
embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) 
The United States or any agency thereof or any 
officer (or any person acting under that officer) 
of the United States or of any agency thereof, in 
an official or individual capacity, for or relating 
to any act under color of such office … 
The “or any person acting under that officer” language 
effects an expansion of coverage that is relevant here.  But the 
statute itself constitutes a break with tradition.  “Section 
1442(a) is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
under which (absent diversity) a defendant may not remove a 
case to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint 
establishes that the case arises under federal law.”  Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 644 n.12 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Unlike the general 
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removal statute, the federal officer removal statute is to be 
‘broadly construed’ in favor of a federal forum.”  Defender 
Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 466-67 (quoting Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab 
Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1262 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also 
Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406 (noting that the scope of the 
federal officer removal statute “is not narrow or limited”).  
 
We have held that, in order to properly remove a case 
under § 1442(a)(1), a defendant must meet four requirements:  
(1) [the defendant] is a “person” within the 
meaning of the statute; (2) the [plaintiff’s] 
claims are based upon the [defendant’s] conduct 
“acting under” the United States, its agencies, 
or its officers; (3) the [plaintiff’s] claims against 
[the defendant] are “for, or relating to” an act 
under color of federal office; and (4) [the 
defendant] raises a colorable federal defense to 
the [plaintiff’s] claims. 
Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 467 (citation omitted).5  We 
address each requirement in turn.  
 
1.  Boeing is a “person” within the meaning 
  of the statute  
 
Boeing’s status as a “person” within the meaning of 
the statute is undisputed.  Because §1442(a)(1) does not itself 
define the term “person,” we look to § 1 of Title I of the 
                                              
5 Although the District Court’s opinion seemed to elide 
the distinction between the “acting under” and “for or relating 
to” requirements, we address them separately, in keeping with 
the test we announced in Defender Ass’n., 790 F.3d at 467.  
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United States Code, which defines “person” to “include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”  
Under this definition, Boeing, a corporation, is in legal fact a 
person. 
 
2.  Boeing was “acting under” a federal  
  officer or agency  
 
 The District Court’s decision to remand this case was 
based on its conclusion that Boeing had failed to demonstrate 
that it was “acting under” a federal officer or agency when it 
did not warn of the dangers associated with asbestos.  That 
conclusion was predicated on two errors.  First, the Court 
wrongly believed that, because Boeing was a federal 
contractor and not a federal officer, it faced a “special 
burden” to demonstrate that it was acting under the control of 
the federal government.  (App. at 6.)  Second, the Court 
mistakenly posited that the only way Boeing could show it 
acted under a federal officer was to show “that a federal 
officer or agency directly prohibited Boeing” from warning 
third-parties of asbestos risks.  (App. at 11.) 
 
  The “acting under” requirement, like the federal 
removal statute overall, is to be “liberally construe[d]” to 
cover actions that involve “an effort to assist, or to help carry 
out, the federal supervisor’s duties or tasks.”  Ruppel v. CBS 
Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Watson 
v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 152 (2007)); see 
also Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 468 (construing “acting 
under” liberally).  The classic case of such assistance as it 
relates to government contractors is when “the private 
contractor acted under a federal officer or agency because the 
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contractors ‘help[ed] the Government to produce an item that 
it need[ed].’” Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 468 (quoting 
Watson, 551 U.S. at 153).  When, as occurred in this instance, 
“the federal government uses a private corporation to achieve 
an end it would have otherwise used its own agents to 
complete,” that contractor is “acting under” the authority of a 
federal officer.  Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1181; see also Defender 
Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 468-70 (discussing different ways in which 
an entity might “act under” a federal officer).  Thus, the 
proposition that contractors bear some additional “special 
burden” is inconsistent with both precedent and the 
underlying objectives of the removal statute.   
 
 Further, we have explicitly rejected the notion that a 
defendant could only be “acting under” a federal officer if the 
complained-of conduct was done at the specific behest of the 
federal officer or agency.  See Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 
470 (“[W]e disagree that the [defendant] is required to allege 
that the complained-of conduct itself was at the behest of a 
federal agency.”).  Instead, we have held that “[i]t is sufficient 
for the ‘acting under’ inquiry that the allegations are directed 
at the relationship between the [defendant] and the [federal 
officer or agency].”  Id.  
 
Considered under the proper standard, it is plain that 
the allegations against Boeing all involve conduct that 
occurred when it was “acting under” the direction of a federal 
officer or agency.  In fact, we are presented here with an 
archetypal case.  Papp’s allegations are directed at actions 
Boeing took while working under a federal contract to 
produce an item the government needed, to wit, a military 
aircraft, and that the government otherwise would have been 
forced to produce on its own.  That being so, Boeing easily 
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satisfies the “acting under” requirement of the § 1442(a)(1) 
inquiry.   
 
3.  The Complaint rests on acts done “for or 
  relating to” a federal officer or agency  
 The next requirement, often referred to as the “nexus” 
or “causation” requirement, demands that the alleged conduct 
have been undertaken “for or relating to” a federal office.  
Under the prior version of the statute, which required a 
showing that a defendant had been sued “for any act under 
color of [federal] office,” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2011), a 
defendant had to “show a nexus, a causal connection between 
the charged conduct and asserted official authority.”  
Jefferson Cty., Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) 
(quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  But given the addition of the words “or 
relating to” in the 2011 revision of the statute – a change that 
was intended to “broaden the universe of acts that enable 
Federal officers to remove [suits] to Federal court,” H.R. Rep. 
No. 112-17, pt. 1, at 6 (2011) – we have taken a more 
permissive view of this requirement.  Specifically, we have 
held that, in order to meet the “for or relating to” requirement, 
“it is sufficient for there to be a connection or association 
between the act in question and the federal office.”  Defender 
Ass’n, 790 F.3d at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 Here, there is indeed a connection or association 
between the acts complained of by Papp and the federal 
government.  At the heart of Papp’s claim against Boeing is 
the failure to provide sufficient warning about the dangers of 
asbestos in the landing gear of the C-47 aircraft.  In its notice 
of removal, Boeing asserts that the C-47 was manufactured 
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“for the United States Armed Forces under the direct 
supervision, control, order, and directive of federal 
government officers acting under the color of federal office,”  
(App. at 39), and that that control extended to “the content of 
written materials and warnings associated with such aircraft,” 
(id. at 41).  Those alleged facts alone satisfy the “for or 
relating to” requirement, as they demonstrate a direct 
connection or association between the federal government 
and the failure to warn described by Papp.  As a result, 
Boeing has satisfied the third requirement of § 1442(a)(1).  
 
4.  Boeing raises a colorable federal   
  defense  
 
 The fourth and final requirement to demonstrate 
removal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1) is that the defendant 
raise a “colorable federal defense.”  Defender Ass’n, 790 F.3d 
at 467.  Boeing asserted in its notice of removal that it was 
entitled to the “military contractor defense” announced in 
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).  Under 
Boyle, a federal contractor cannot be held liable for a state 
tort if, in the context of the work at issue, “(1) the United 
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the 
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the 
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use 
of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to 
the United States.”  Id. at 512.  Because Papp’s claim against 
Boeing is predicated on a failure-to-warn theory, the Boyle 
test could be rephrased to cover Boeing’s actions as follows: 
(1) the government approved specifications for the C-47, 
including certain warnings for the plane; (2) Boeing provided 
the warnings required by the government; and (3) Boeing told 
the government about any asbestos hazards that were then 
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known to it but not to the government.  See Leite, 749 F.3d at 
1123 (noting that the government contractor defense is 
established by the defendant showing that “(1) the 
[government] exercised its discretion and approved certain 
warnings for [the defendant]’s products, (2) [the defendant] 
provided the warnings required by the [government], and (3) 
[the defendant] warned the [government] about any asbestos 
hazards that were known to [the defendant] but not to the 
[government]”).6   
 
Taking the undisputed facts from the notice of 
removal, including the Fogg Declaration, as true, Boeing has 
stated sufficient facts to make out a colorable defense.  As to 
the first element of the Boyle test, Boeing asserted that the 
government exercised complete control over “any markings 
or labels on [Boeing] aircraft or aircraft components,” that in-
                                              
6 We are not alone in permitting defendants to raise the 
government contractor defense from Boyle in failure-to-warn 
cases; the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have all allowed the defense in such cases.  
See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 
626, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1990); Ripley v. Foster Wheeler LLC, __ 
F.3d __, No. 15-1918, 2016 WL 6441049, at *2 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 1, 2016); Perez v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Air Disaster at 
Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 8/29/90), 81 F.3d 570, 576 
(5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 88 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 
1996) (per curiam); Tate v. Boeing Helicopters (Tate II), 140 
F.3d 654, 656 (6th Cir. 1998); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 
96 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1996); Snell v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1997); Dorse v. 
Eagle–Picher Indus., Inc., 898 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
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person meetings occurred between Boeing and government 
personnel where warnings were discussed, and that “[t]he 
contents, including any warnings, of any technical manuals… 
were directed, reviewed, and approved by” the government.  
(Opening Br. at 19-20.)   
 
As to the second element, Boeing’s notice of removal 
and the attached Fogg Declaration are explicit that Boeing 
followed every specification set forth by the government 
when building the C-47 aircraft.   
 
Finally, as to the third element, the Fogg Declaration 
states that, at the time the C-47 aircraft was being built, 
Boeing was not aware of the health hazards of asbestos.  
Furthermore, some of the documents produced by Boeing 
suggest that the government had a superior understanding of 
the risks of asbestos.7  Because we are bound to accept 
Boeing’s assertion that the risks were not known to it, Boeing 
did not have any superior knowledge that it withheld from the 
government.  
 
The District Court took issue with several points in the 
Fogg Declaration, in particular Fogg’s assertion that the 
government had oversight of the warnings related to the 
aircraft.  The Court seemed especially troubled that Fogg did 
not provide thorough citations to the documents delivered 
with his declaration.  Given the posture of the case though, 
that objection is misplaced.  A defendant “need not win his 
case before he can have it removed.”  Willingham, 395 U.S. at 
407.  At the removal stage, Boeing needed only show that its 
                                              
 7 Examples of that may be found in bulletins, 
pamphlets, and technical manuals provided in the record.   
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asserted Boyle defense was “colorable,” which is to say that 
the defense was “legitimate and [could] reasonably be 
asserted, given the facts presented and the current law.”  
Colorable Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014); see also Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co., 739 F. Supp. 
2d 770, 782-83 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“[A] defense is colorable for 
purposes of determining jurisdiction under Section 1442(a)(1) 
if the defendant asserting it identifies facts which, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the defendant, would establish a 
complete defense at trial.”).  It has done so and, not 
insignificantly, the facts presented were not contested in the 
District Court.  If Boeing is able to prove at trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts alleged in its notice 
of removal, including the facts asserted in the Fogg 
Declaration, it will have established a prima facie defense 
under Boyle and may prevail on the merits.  That is sufficient 
to constitute a “colorable” federal defense.  Boeing’s notice 
of removal thus met the fourth and final requirement of 
§ 1442(a)(1). 
 
Having satisfied all of § 1442(a)(1)’s requirements, 
Boeing established its entitlement to proceed in federal court, 
but Papp makes one further statement to forestall that result.  
 
B. TIMELINESS 
 
In addition to challenging the merits of Boeing’s 
removal argument, Papp asserts, in the alternative, that 
Boeing did not timely seek removal.  That assertion, made in 
a footnote, reads as follows:  
 
Because the Court below determined that 
remand was jurisdictionally required under the 
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second grounds, it did not deem it necessary to 
address the timeliness issue.  However, since 
the issue of jurisdiction[8] is de novo before this 
Court, should [the District Court’s] stated 
rationale for remand not be accepted, it is 
respectfully submitted that the issue of 
timeliness, which was fully briefed by both 
parties below, would be an appropriate subject 
for consideration. 
(Ans. Br. at 5 n.4 (internal citations to the record omitted).)  It 
is well established that “[f]ederal courts of appeals refuse to 
take cognizance of arguments that are made in passing 
without proper development.”  Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. 
__, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1095 (2013); see also Reynolds v. 
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]n argument 
consisting of no more than a conclusory assertion … will be 
deemed waived.”).  The footnote, standing alone, does not 
sufficiently present Papp’s argument on the issue of 
timeliness.  Indeed, it is not even phrased as an argument, but 
rather simply states that the issue would be “appropriate for 
consideration.”  (Ans. Br. at 5 n.4.)  The only sense in which 
Papp makes an argument at all is by reference to what he said 
somewhere else, trying to incorporate arguments he made 
before the District Court.  To permit parties to present 
arguments in that fashion would effectively nullify the page 
                                              
8 Though not necessary to the resolution of this issue, 
it bears mention that timeliness of removal under the federal 
officer removal statute is not, in fact, a jurisdictional issue.  
See Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It 
is well settled that § 1446(b)’s thirty-day time limit for 
removal is a procedural provision, not a jurisdictional one.”). 
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or word limits imposed by the appellate and local rules.  See 
Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 623-
24 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Allowing litigants to adopt district court 
filings would provide an effective means of circumventing 
the page limitations on briefs set forth in the appellate rules 
….”).  That cannot be permitted, and we join our fellow 
Circuits in declining to do so.  See id. (collecting cases).9  
Papp has therefore forfeited any argument as to timeliness.10 
                                              
9 As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Gaines-Tabb, the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have already 
endorsed this rule.  160 F.3d at 623-24.  Since the time that 
Gaines-Tabb was decided, the rule has also been adopted by 
the Second, Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 833 (2d Cir. 
1996), vacated on other grounds, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997); and 
Sixth Circuits, Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 
327 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2003).  Cf. Sandgathe v. Maass, 
314 F.3d 371, 380 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (admonishing counsel 
for incorporating arguments by reference, but rejecting those 
arguments on the merits). 
 
10 Even were that issue preserved, it would not change 
our conclusion on the matter.  Papp’s principal argument 
relies on the notion that Boeing’s removal was untimely 
because it came 45 days after the filing of the Complaint, 
outside of the 30 day window provided by the statute.  The 
statute also provides, however, that, “if the case stated by the 
initial pleading is not removable” the notice of removal may 
be filed within 30 days following receipt of “an amended 
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first 
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 
removable.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).  Here, Boeing asserts 
that it was not aware that Papp was making a claim related to 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse.  
                                                                                                     
Boeing’s role as a federal contractor until the deposition of 
Mary Papp, during which Boeing learned for the first time 
that the allegations against it related to its production of the 
C-47 aircraft.   
Papp concedes that answers to deposition questions 
“can constitute ‘other paper’ for purposes of triggering the 
time for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”  (App. at 120).  
He argues, however, that Boeing should have been able to 
ascertain from its own records what specific aircraft Keck 
was working on based on Keck’s place and timing of 
employment, and therefore determine whether there was a 
federal defense available.  Setting aside the fact that nothing 
in the record supports the assertion that Boeing could have 
made such a deduction, Boeing simply was not required to do 
so.  See In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Foster v. Mutual 
Fire Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 53 (3d 
Cir.1993), rev’d on other grounds, Murphy Bros., Inc. v. 
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (noting 
that we look only to the “four corners of the pleading” to see 
if it “informs the reader, to a substantial degree of specificity, 
that all elements of federal jurisdiction are present,” and ask 
“not what the defendant knew, but what the relevant 
document said.”)).  As a result, the relevant date for 
determining the timeliness of Boeing’s motion to remove was 
the September 5, 2013 deposition of Mary Papp, and 
Boeing’s October 4, 2013 filing was therefore timely.   
